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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
This is a petition for review of a NPDES permit issued under 
the Clean Water Act by the EPA Region XII. Petitioners Fossil 
Creek Watchers, Inc., and Enerprog, L.L.C., filed timely petitions 
for review of the permit with the Environmental Appeals Board 
(EAB) pursuant to 40 C.F.R. section 124. Upon the EAB issuing its 
order, both petitioners filed timely petitions to this Court. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 
section 1369(b). 
 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
I.   Whether, where Congress expressly intended for 
independent state authority over water pollution discharge, 
the Clean Water Act’s state certification provision allows for 
a state to certify a NPDES permit on the condition that the 
polluter close and remediate a substandard coal ash pond as 
required by state law. 
 
II.  Whether the April 25, 2017 EPA Notice, suspending future 
compliance deadlines for a properly promulgated rule (2015 
Final Effluent Limitation Guidelines) without an 
opportunity for public comment is effective to require the 
suspension of the permit compliance deadlines for achieving 
zero discharge of coal ash transport water. 
 
III.   Whether the EPA could rely on Best Professional Judgment 
as an alternative ground to require zero discharge of coal ash 
transport wastes, when the applicable effluent limitation 
guideline did not apply to pollutants addressed by the zero 
discharge requirement. 
 
IV.  Whether National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
permit requirements apply to discharges into a waste 
containment system located in a water of the United States, 
where:  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/5
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A. An agency action exempting such waste systems from 
the definition of waters of the United States was 
promulgated in violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act; and  
B. The waste treatment system is substandard 
presenting a heightened risk of pollution discharges 
into a navigable in-fact river. 
 
V.  Whether the Clean Water Act requires a dredge and fill 
permit for the closure and capping of an ash pond, where the 
existing ash will remain in place and the waterbody, before 
the dam and pond were built, was a perennial tributary to a 
nearby navigable in-fact river. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
This is a petition for judicial review of an Environmental 
Appeals Board (EAB) decision denying review of a Clean Water Act 
(CWA) National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit renewal issued by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Region XII. R. at 2. In addition to authorizing EnerProg, L.L.C. 
(EnerProg) to continue its water pollution discharges at its 
Moutard Electric Generating Station (MEGS), a coal-fired steam 
electric plant located in Fossil, Progress, the permit included 
limitations that would update the MEGS facility to 21st century 
standards. Id. However, as required by the CWA, prior to the EPA 
issuing the NPDES permit, the State of Progress provided a water 
quality certification, which contained certain permit approval 
conditions. Id. Progress certified the permit on the condition that 
EnerProg close and remediate its coal ash pond in compliance with 
Progress’ Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CACA). Id. The petitioners, Fossil 
Creek Watchers (FCW) and EnerProg, appealed the EPA’s 
issuance of the NPDES permit on separate grounds. R. at 2-3. In 
addition to Progress’ conditions, in accordance with the EPA’s 2015 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines (ELGs), the NPDES permit 
required that the plant implement a zero-discharge requirement 
for coal ash disposal. R at 9. 
However, EnerProg, objected to the NPDES permit’s inclusion 
of the conditions claiming: 1) The inclusion of Progress’ CACA 
certification conditions as permit requirements are not sufficiently 
3
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related to achieving water quality standards and require EPA 
review; 2) that the EPA’s April 25, 2017 notice that purports to 
extend compliance deadlines for the 2015 Steam Electric Power 
Generating Point Source ELGs, relieves it from complying with the 
permit’s November 1, 2018 zero discharge compliance deadline; 
and 3) that the EPA may not rely on best professional judgment 
(BPJ) as an alternative ground for zero discharge of ash pollution. 
R. at 11. Conversely, FCW opposes EnerProg’s arguments and 
additionally alleges that since the ash pond is in the former 
streambed of Fossil Creek, a perennial tributary to a navigable in-
fact river, it is a water of the United States (WOTUS) and 
discharge into the ash pond is subject to section 402 requirements. 
R. at 12. Further, FCW argues that the plan to close and cap the 
coal ash pond necessitates a section 404 fill permit. Id. 
 
A.  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
 
The MEGS facility is a coal power plant in Fossil, Progress, 
that has one unit with a maximum capacity of 745 megawatts. R. 
at 7. The coal plant relies on the Moutard Reservoir for its 
operational and drinking water needs, withdrawing nearly 125 
million gallons a day, as well as its final point of pollution 
discharge. R. at 8. In 1978, EnerProg dammed the upper reach of 
the then free-flowing Fossil Creek, a perennial tributary to the 
navigable-in-fact Progress River to create the ash pond for the 
MEGS facility. R. at 7. The upper reach of Fossil Creek’s streambed 
is now filled with toxic coal ash byproducts such as mercury, 
arsenic, and selenium. Id. Due to an EPA action in 1980 that 
suspended waste treatment ponds located in a WOTUS from being 
defined as a WOTUS, Fossil Creek’s WOTUS status was effectively 
stripped away. R. at 12; Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 48620-01 (July 21, 1980). 
The MEGS ash pond is the pollution receptacle for the MEGS 
facility. R. at 8-9. The pond receives pollutants from several 
outfalls, including: two internal outfalls (Outfall 008 and 
and various low volume sources, with Outfall 008 containing 
bottom ash and fly ash transport water, and the cooling tower 
blowdown; Outfall 009, with flue gas desulfurization (FGD) 
wastewater and heavy concentrations of metals and chloride that’s 
treated by the vapor compression evaporator before entering the 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/5
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ash pond; and other pollutant sources, such as coal pile runoff, 
stormwater runoff, and wastes such as boiler blowdown, oily waste 
treatment, wastes/backwash from the water treatment processes 
including Reverse-Osmosis (RO) wastewater, plant area wash 
down water, landfill leachate, monofill leachate, equipment heat 
exchanger water, groundwater, yard sump overflows, occasional 
piping leakage from limestone slurry and the FGD system, and 
treated domestic wastewater. Id. 
MEGS uses the ash pond to treat the above waste streams by 
sedimentation before discharging directly into Moutard Reservoir 
through Outfall 002. R. at 7-8. MEGS also discharges water used 
in the coal plant’s cooling tower system into the Moutard Reservoir 
about once per year. R. at 8. While heavier sediments are settled 
out in the ash pond before entering Moutard Reservoir, many toxic 
pollutants cannot be treated by sedimentation alone. R. at 9. Thus, 
the ash pond effluent discharged into the Moutard Reservoir 
contains elevated levels of toxic pollutants such as mercury, 
arsenic, and selenium. Id. 
To continue its pollution discharges into the Moutard 
Reservoir, EnerProg applied for renewal of its federal NPDES 
permit under the requirements of the CWA section 402. R. at 6. 
Prior to the EPA issuing renewal of a NPDES permit, the CWA 
requires the State of Progress to issue a certification and that 
NPDES permit include Effluent Limitation Guidelines (ELGs) - 
Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, per 40 
C.F.R. section 423. R. at 8. Incorporating these requirements, on 
January 18, 2017, under section 402 of the CWA, the EPA issued 
a NPDES permit to EnerProg authorizing continued water 
pollution discharges into the Moutard Reservoir, on the condition 
that EnerProg close and remediate its substandard coal ash pond 
and institute zero discharge methods for coal ash disposal. R. at 6. 
The state of Progress issued its certification contingent on the 
closure and remediation of EnerProg’s ash pond. R at 8. Clean-up 
of EnerProg’s ash pond is necessary to comply with the CACA, a 
state-enacted law that requires assessment, closure, and 
remediation of substandard coal ash disposal facilities in the State 
of Progress. R. at 8. CACA has a specific purpose to prevent public 
hazards associated with the failures of ash treatment pond 
containment systems, as well as leaks from treatment ponds into 
ground and surface waters. R. at 8-9. In its NPDES certification 
5
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process, Progress deemed EnerProg’s ash pond substandard and 
found that closure and remediation was necessary to comply with 
CACA. R. at 8. To comply with CACA, Progress imposed the 
following conditions on EnerProg: 1) by November 1, 2018 
EnerProg must cease operation of its ash pond; 2) complete 
dewatering of its ash pond by September 1, 2019; and 3) cover the 
ash pond with an impermeable cap by September 1, 2020. R. at 10. 
The EPA relied on the applicable 2015 ELG issued by EPA to 
require the zero discharge of coal ash transport waters. R. at 9. In 
the 2015 Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category 
ELGs (2015 ELGs), EPA determined that the best available 
technology (BAT) for toxic discharges associated with bottom ash 
and fly ash is zero discharge. Id.; Effluent Limitations Guidelines 
and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point 
Source Category, 80 Fed. Reg. 67837 (Nov. 3, 2015). The EPA 
determined EnerProg was capable of meeting the zero-discharge 
requirement by the earliest compliance deadline of November 1, 
2018. R. at 9. However, three months after EPA issued EnerProg 
the NPDES permit, on April 25, 2017, the EPA Administrator, 
Scott Pruitt, postponed the compliance dates of the 2015 ELGs in 
a postponement notice. R. at 11; Postponement of Certain 
Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source 
Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19005 (Apr. 25, 2017). The postponement 
notice relied on section 705 to of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), which allows an agency to “postpone the effective date of an 
action taken by it, pending judicial review.” R at 11; 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 19005; 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). The 2015 ELGs are part of ongoing 
litigation in the Fifth Circuit. However, the postponement was 
issued after the “effective date” of the 2015 ELGs, without notice 
and comment, and without referencing the impact of the ongoing 
litigation on the ELGs. R. at 12. 
Regardless of the status of the 2015 ELGs, the EPA 
determined that independent from the 2015 ELGs, the permit 
must contain limits for toxic pollutants based on the BAT. R at 9. 
EPA determined that zero discharge via dry handling of bottom 
ash and fly ash has been in use by many plants in the industry for 
years, and that EnerProg is sufficiently profitable to transition by 
November 1, 2018. Moreover, EnerProg would likely pass its costs 
to consumers “with no more than twelve cents per month increase 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/5
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in the average consumer’s electric bill.” R. at 9. Therefore, under 
the agency’s BPJ zero discharge should be required. R. at 9. 
The final NPDES permit forbid EnerProg from discharging 
bottom ash or fly ash transport water into the ash pond by 
November 1, 2018, in order to comply with CACA, the 2015 ELG, 
and, if necessary, the EPA’s BPJ. R. at 10. EnerProg was also 
required by CACA to stop using the ash pond, remediate it, and 
create a new retention basin with a liner to deter pollution leaking 
into groundwater. R. at 8. The new retention basin would function 
as a modern waste treatment pond accepting the same pollutants 
minus bottom and fly ash. Id. To ensure that the MEGS facility 
complies with CACA and that adequate safeguards are in place to 
protect the citizens of Progress from public hazards and water 
pollution, these updates to the MEGS outdated coal ash pollution 
treatment methods are necessary. R. at 8-9. 
 
B.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On January 18, 2017, pursuant to section 402 of the CWA, the 
EPA issued a NPDES permit containing Progress’ certification 
conditions to EnerProg. R. at 6. The EAB extended the appeal filing 
deadline for both parties, and timely petitions were filed on April 
1, 2017, with supplemental briefs filed subsequent to the April 25, 
2017 Notice of the suspension of the 2015 ELG compliance 
deadline. Id. EnerProg challenged the NPDES permit conditions 
on several grounds, while FCW challenged that the ash pond and 
the closure plan was subject to additional CWA permitting 
requirements. R. at 11-12. 
The EAB denied both appeals and affirmed the NPDES permit 
holding that: 1) Ash pond remediation is sufficiently related to 
water quality and, therefore, Progress’ certification conditions are 
properly included in the NPDES permit, and regardless, EPA has 
no discretion to reject a condition included in a State’s 401 
certification; 2) the Administrative Procedure Act does not 
authorize the extension of compliance dates, only the effective date 
of the rule, and that since the effective date of the 2015 ELGs had 
already passed, the April 25, 2017 suspension notice had no effect 
on the 2015 ELG; 3) the EPA’s reliance on BPJ is appropriate, 
regardless of the status of 2015 ELGs, was justified because the 
types of pollutants in the ash pond are not subject to ELG 
7
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regulations; 4) that the ash pond was not a WOTUS since a 1980 
EPA action suspending ash ponds in streambeds from within the 
definition of a WOTUS applies; and 5) that a section 404 permit 
was not required for the coal ash pond closure and capping because 
the ash pond is not a WOTUS and a recapture provision is not 
included in the EPA’s 1980 action. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), the EPA lacks the 
authority to review state National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit certification conditions that are necessary 
to comply with “appropriate” state law. A large majority of circuit 
courts where this issue has been presented have ruled that the 
EPA lacks review authority over state NPDES certification 
conditions that are similar to Progress’. See infra Part I(A). 
Additionally, Progress’ conditions required under the Coal Ash 
Cleanup Act (CACA), are “appropriate” state law because as the 
Supreme Court ruled and circuit courts clarified, conditions 
certifying compliance with “state water protection laws” are at a 
minimum considered “appropriate.” S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. 
of Envtl. Protec., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006). Therefore, the EAB was 
correct in holding that the EPA lacks review authority over 
Progress’ appropriate conditions. 
The EPA may independently rely on EPA’s 2015 Effluent 
Limitation Guidelines (ELGs) to require zero discharge of coal ash. 
EPA’s postponement action of the 2015 ELGs compliance dates, 
that was after the effective date of the regulation had passed, was 
constructively a repeal requiring notice and comment under the 
APA. 5 U.S.C. 551(5) (2012). Under the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA), the EPA may postpone the effective date of a rule, not 
the compliance date, and section 705 does not allow the suspension 
of already promulgate rules. Safety–Kleen Corp. v. EPA, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS, *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). In failing to provide 
notice and comment in its postponement, the EPA was in direct 
contrast with the APA’s policy to ensure that “an agency will not 
undo all that it accomplished through its rulemaking without 
giving all parties an opportunity to comment. . . .” Consumer 
Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/5
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425, 446, (D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, the EAB ruled correctly that the 
EPA violated the APA in issuing its postponement action. 
The EPA may also independently rely on best professional 
judgment (BPJ) to require zero discharge when the applicable ELG 
fails to control all pollutants of concern. EPA regulations 
specifically allow for a permit writer to regulate pollutants on a 
case-by-case basis, if those pollutants were not controlled by an 
ELG. 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(1)-(2); 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290. Here, 
the 1982 ELG fails to control specific pollutants such as mercury, 
arsenic, and selenium. Not allowing the EPA to use BPJ to 
determine the appropriate controls would be contrary to the 
objectives of the CWA and facially in violation of EPA’s 
promulgated regulations. Therefore, the court should find that 
EPA may alternatively rely on BPJ to require zero discharge of 
bottom ash and fly ash. 
Additionally, EnerProg should be required to obtain a NPDES 
permit for all discharges into the MEGS ash pond because the EPA 
violated the APA in suspending CWA jurisdiction from such ponds 
and the pond should independently be considered a point source. 
The EPA’s action in 45 Federal Register 46820 (1980 Suspension), 
is contrary to the APA because the APA requires notice and 
comment where an agency action effectively rewrites a rule. Nat’l. 
Retired Teachers Ass’n v. U. S. Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 1360, 1363 
(D.C. Cir. 1979). The EPA’s suspension changes the legal 
consequences of industry action and changes the explicit language 
of the properly promulgated rule. EPA also failed to have good 
cause when it effectively rewrote the regulation because the 
industry would not be unduly harmed. The regulation was properly 
promulgated with notice and comment, so, the industry had a 
chance to object to obligations before the obligations were applied. 
Furthermore, EnerProg’s MEGS ash pond should independently be 
considered a point source to the Progress River because of its 
hydrologic connection to the river. Therefore, any pollutants 
discharged into the pond are subject to NPDES permitting 
requirements under EPA regulations and the definition of point 
source. 
EnerProg’s closure and capping plan also requires a section 
404 permit because EPA’s 1980 Suspension would not exclude the 
ash pond from coverage under the CWA after it was no longer being 
used as a “waste containment system.” Once the pond ceases to 
9
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receive discharges from the MEGS facility, the pond can no longer 
be considered a “waste treatment system,” thus, in accordance with 
the CWA’s objectives to protect and restore the Nation’s waters, 
Fossil Creek’s status as a WOTUS must be restored. Additionally, 
in past jurisdictional determinations, the USACE has determined 
that similar coal ash disposal pond closures implicated section 404 
of the CWA. Therefore, the EPA failed to identify the coal ash 
dewatering as an action requiring a section 404 permit. EAB 
incorrectly held that section 404 does not apply, and this Court 
should rule that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in failing to 
require a section 404 permit. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Judicial review of EPA agency actions has several components. 
First, to obtain judicial review of NPDES permits, the petitioner 
must first appeal the final agency action to the EAB. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 124.19(l)(1) (2017). Second, under APA section 706, where the 
agency made factual findings and conclusions, the reviewing Court 
shall: “(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, 
capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). Third, where 
issues of interpretation of laws arise, the court must determine 
whether the agency action complies with the Chevron test. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 847, 842-43 
(1984). If it is shown that congress delegated the issue to the 
agency, then the Chevron test requires the reviewing court to 
determine: (1) whether congress, in writing the law, 
unambiguously expressed its intentions; and (2) if ambiguity 
exists, “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.” Id. at 842-43. 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. UNDER THE CWA SECTION 401, FEDERAL 
AGENCIES LACK REVIEW AUTHORITY OVER A 
STATE’S CERTIFICATION CONDITIONS WHEN 
THOSE CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY TO 
COMPLY WITH A STATE LAW AND ARE 
RELATED TO WATER QUALITY. 
 
The EAB correctly found that under the CWA, the EPA lacks 
discretion to reject a condition included in a CWA section 401 state 
certification, and that CACA’s requirements are within the scope 
of section 401(d) since they are related to water quality. The CWA 
requires polluters to obtain a state certification that a proposed 
discharge will comply with the CWA and any other appropriate 
requirement of state law. Appropriate requirements of state law 
are those that relate to water quality. States are authorized to 
impose certification conditions on permits to provide reasonable 
assurance that the activity will comply with CWA provisions or the 
state’s water protection laws. Progress’ conditions were not only 
required by CACA, but also necessary for Progress to have 
reasonable assurance that the MEGS facility would comply with 
water quality standards throughout the NPDES permit period 
because the MEGS ash pond was substandard and presents a 
heightened risk to water quality. The CWA, Congress’ intent, EPA 
documents, and case law dictate that the EPA lacks discretionary 
authority to review or exclude Progress’ certification conditions. 
Therefore, this Court should uphold the EABs ruling that the EPA 
lacks review authority and the Progress’ conditions are 
appropriate. 
 
A. The EPA Lacks Review Authority of Progress’ 
Permit Conditions Because They Are a Necessary 
Compliance Requirement of Progress’ Coal Ash 
Cleanup Act. 
 
EPA’s lack of discretionary authority over a state’s 
certification conditions is supported by the plain language of the 
CWA, Congressional intent, EPA’s promulgated regulations and 
11
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guidance documents, and a wealth of case law. The CWA requires 
polluters to obtain a NPDES permit prior to discharging pollutants 
into a navigable water. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). The NPDES 
permit must include state certification that “any applicant. . . will 
comply with any applicable [CWA provisions]. . . and with any 
other appropriate requirement of State law. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-
1342 (2012) (emphasis added). Any state certification condition 
“shall become a condition on any Federal license or permit subject 
to the provisions of this section.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (2012) 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, section 511(c)(2) of the CWA 
which precludes federal review of state certifications under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, implies that federal review of 
state conditions is precluded throughout the CWA, as well as 
NEPA: “Nothing in NEPA. . . shall be deemed to authorize any 
federal agency. . . to review any effluent limitation or other 
requirement established pursuant to this chapter or the adequacy 
of any certification under [section 401].” 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(2)(A) 
(2012). EPA lacks review authority over Progress’ certification 
conditions because the CWA does not directly give the EPA that 
authority, and sections of the CWA imply that no federal review 
authority exists. 
The CWA was designed so that federal and state 
environmental requirements could coexist, and if the EPA had 
review authority over state requirements, this system of 
cooperative federalism would not work. In drafting the CWA, 
Congress was explicit that the purpose of the law and section 401 
was to grant the states independent authority over any pollution 
discharge in its waters. The goal and policy of the CWA is to 
“recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities of 
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(b)(2012). In drafting section 401 to allow for state 
certification of discharge permits, Senator Muskie stated: “No 
polluter will be able to hide behind a Federal license or permit as 
an excuse for a violation of water quality standard[s].” 116 Cong. 
Rec. 8984 (1970). This reasoning is why Congress included section 
401 in the CWA to allow states to allowed states to “play a major 
part in the fight against pollution. . .” and provided states with a 
mechanism to impose more stringent water quality requirements 
on activities that may result in discharge. S.D. Warren Co. v. 
Maine Bd. of Envtl. Protec., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006) (citing 116 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/5
  
2018] RUNNER UP – BEST BRIEF 151 
Cong. Rec. 8984 (1970)). Giving the EPA discretionary authority 
over Progress’ certification conditions, would upset the purpose of 
the CWA and negatively impact the CWA’s policy of cooperative 
federalism. 
In addition to the congressional intent of the CWA, the EPA’s 
rules and guidance documents, prevent the agency from reviewing 
state conditions. EPA explicitly states in rules promulgated by the 
agency that “[r]eview and appeals of. . . [State certification 
conditions] shall be made through the applicable procedures of the 
State. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (2017). The EPA has concluded in 
legal guidance to the regulated community that the “EPA has no 
authority to ignore State certification or to determine whether 
limitations certified by the State are more stringent than required 
to meet the requirements of State law.” EPA, Decision of the 
General Counsel No. 58 (March 29, 1977) (emphasis added). The 
EPA may not review Progress’ conditions because promulgated 
regulations prevent it from doing so, and EPA itself has 
determined that it lacks the authority to review state certification 
conditions in NPDES permits. 
Progress’ certifying conditions are required in order to comply 
with CACA, a state law; therefore, as indicated by caselaw, the 
power to review these conditions lies solely in the Progress State 
Court. Several Circuit Courts have held that federal agencies and 
courts lack review authority over a state’s certification condition 
when the condition was based on state law. Alcoa Power 
Generating Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 643 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding 
certification conditions are generally only reviewable in state 
court, but if the CWA floor is implicated, review by a federal court 
is proper); Roosevelt Campobello Intern. Park Commn. v. U.S. 
E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that proper 
review of state law issues is in state court); Am. Rivers, Inc. v. 
F.E.R.C., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the permit 
issuer did not have the authority to reject state certification 
conditions); Lake Erie All. for Protec. of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding 
same); Ackels v. U.S. E.P.A., 7 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); 
Progress relied on its state law, CACA, to impose ash pond 
conditions. Therefore, the EPA and the federal court lack the 
authority to review the conditions, and proper jurisdiction is in the 
state court for review.  
13
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The lone decision that allowed the EPA review of a state 
recommendation is consistent with caselaw that does not allow 
federal review of certification conditions applying state law. In 
Consolidation Coal Co., Inc. v. E.P.A., the state agency 
recommended a two-year permit in order to apply more stringent 
effluent limitations required by the CWA. Consolidation Coal Co., 
Inc. v. E.P.A., 537 F.2d 1236, 1237 (4th Cir. 1976). This was not a 
certification condition based on the application of state law. So, the 
Fourth Circuit allowed agency review of the condition, where no 
state review procedures existed to determine the appropriateness 
of a two-year durational limitation on a NPDES permit. Id. 
Further, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Consolidation Coal, was 
expressly declined to follow by the Seventh Circuit, holding that 
where no review procedures exist, a federal question of due process 
is implicated allowing federal courts and not the EPA to review. 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 1977). Neither 
circuit decision allows the EPA to review state certification 
conditions that are based on state laws, as Progress has done in 
the current case. 
If this Court were to rule that EPA has review authority over 
state section 401 certification conditions, it would render Congress’ 
intent in reserving state authority over water pollution permitting 
meaningless, go against the grain of Supreme Court and Circuit 
Court precedent, and invalidate longstanding EPA regulations. 
Therefore, this court should uphold the EAB’s ruling that the EPA 
lacks review authority over Progress’ certification conditions. 
 
B. Regardless, Progress’ Permit Conditions are 
“Appropriate Requirements of State Law” 
Because Closure and Remediation of the Ash 
Pond Is a Necessary Condition for Progress to 
Have Reasonable Assurance that Enerprog Would 
Meet Water Quality Standards. 
 
Regardless of this court’s conclusion on the EPA’s review 
authority, the CWA, EPA regulations, and case law indicates that 
Progress’ certification conditions were “appropriate requirements 
of state law,” authorized by section 401 of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(d) (2012) (emphasis added). Section 510 of the CWA 
prohibits the EPA from denying the right of the state to enforce 
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pollution control stating: “Nothing in this Act shall (1) preclude or 
deny the right of any State . . . to adopt or enforce . . . any 
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution. . . .” 33 
U.S.C. § 1370 (2012) (emphasis added). Because Progress’s 
requirements are more stringent and do not implicate the floor of 
the CWA, the relevant question is whether the certification 
conditions under CACA were “appropriate requirements of state 
law,” which is a term defined through EPA regulations and 
caselaw. 33 U.S.C.1341(d) (2012). 
EPA’s regulations interpret “appropriate requirements of 
state law” broadly enough to include any state requirement that is 
related to water quality and not inconsistent with the CWA. The 
EPA interprets the CWA to require that the state’s conditions find 
that “there is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be 
conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water 
quality standards.” 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (2017) (emphasis 
added). Additionally, EPA promulgated regulations authorize the 
state certifying agency to include a “statement of any conditions 
which the certifying agency deems necessary or desirable with 
respect to the discharge of the activity.” Id. at § 121.2(a)(4) 
(Emphasis added). It cannot be argued that the requirements 
under CACA were not “desirable with respect to the discharge,” 
and that Progress had reasonable assurance that the continued 
substandard ash pond would not result in a water quality violation. 
The closure and capping of MEGS ash pond directly relates to the 
current and historic discharge of coal ash (bottom and fly ash) 
directly into the pond and provides reasonable assurance that 
water quality standards will not be violated. 
CACA’s purpose fits within the Supreme Court’s narrow 
construction of “appropriate requirements of state law.” The 
Supreme Court in Pud No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology held that “at 
a minimum, limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality 
standards adopted pursuant to 303 are ‘appropriate’ requirements 
of state law.” Pud No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 
713 (1994). The Court declined to cap the definition of 
“appropriate” narrowly to only include state law that encompasses 
water quality by determining that appropriate conditions can also 
include minimum streamflow requirements for a dam operator. Id. 
The Court determined that a minimum flow condition was related 
to water quality enough to be considered “appropriate.” Further, 
15
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under S.D. Warren, the Supreme Court expanded its definition of 
appropriate conditions holding that the CWA requires that the 
state certify that its “water protection laws will not be violated.” 
547 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added). 
In addition to the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts have also 
read “appropriate requirements of state law” broadly. In American 
Rivers, Inc., the Second Circuit Court concluded that “Section 
401(d), reasonably read in light of its purpose, restricts [state] 
conditions. . . to those affecting water quality in one manner or 
another.” Am. Rivers, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 
1997). Additionally, the Second Court in Roosevelt Campobello 
held that, where conditions were based a state law was “designed 
to primarily reduce the risk of oil spills” form a refinery, those were 
appropriate conditions. 684 F.2d at 1044. The Progress CACA is 
directly aimed at water quality and water protection with the 
express purpose of preventing “public hazards associated with the 
failures of ash treatment pond containment systems, as well as 
leaks from these treatment ponds into ground and surface waters.” 
R. at 8-9. Because Progress’ conditions and the purpose of CACA 
directly relate to water quality, the certification condition that 
closes EnerProg’s substandard ash pond fits the narrow definition 
of “appropriate” as defined by the courts. 
Progress’ conditions constitute as “appropriate” requirements 
of state law under the broad interpretation that EPA imposes and 
the narrow interpretation that the courts adopt. Therefore, in 
accordance with EPA regulations, and Supreme Court decisions 
the Court should uphold the EAB’s decision to reject EnerProg’s 
objections to Progress’ conditions requiring closure and 
remediation of the substandard coal ash pond. 
 
II. EPA’S POSTPONEMENT OF THE 2015 
EFFLUENT LIMITATION GUIDELINES 
SHOULD BE VACATEDBECAUSE THE 
POSTPONEMENT NOTICEOCCURRED AFTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE2015 ELG RULE 
AND DID NOT COMPLY WITH APA
REQUIREMENTS. 
 
The EAB was correct to reject arguments that “effective date” 
also means “compliance date.” R. at 11-12. Section 705 of the APA 
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authorizes agencies to “postpone the effective date of action taken 
by it, pending judicial review,” and effectively maintain the status 
quo. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012). While “effective date” is not defined in 
the statute, it has a distinct meaning from “compliance date.” 
Section 705 does not on its face authorize the postponement of 
compliance dates, and the phrase “effective date” has been 
interpreted by other jurisdictions, and by the EPA itself, to not 
include compliance dates. Furthermore, the postponement of the 
2015 ELG was effectively a repeal, which is subject to notice and 
comment requirements of section 551 of the APA. Allowing 
postponement would also be contrary to the APA policy of 
providing predictability and consistency to the public. Price v. 
Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 830 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Moreover, the EPA’s delay notice does not meet the APA’s judicial 
review requirement because the postponement was not sufficiently 
related to pending litigation. Therefore, this Court should affirm 
the EAB’s ruling on this issue and hold that the EPA acted 
arbitrary and capricious because its postponement failed to adhere 
to APA requirements. 
 
 A.  Reading “Compliance Date” Into the Meaning of 
“Effective Date” Under Section 705 Of the APA Is 
Contrary To Congress’ Intent. 
 
Congressional intent, an abundance of case law in other 
jurisdictions, and EPA’s own use of “effective date” in rule 
promulgation establish the distinction between “effective date” and 
“compliance date.” EPA’s argument that the “compliance date” is 
within the definition of “effective date” is not consistent with 
congressional intent. The EPA’s interpretation is not entitled to 
Chevron deference because the agency has not been delegated 
authority by Congress to promulgate rules though 5 USC 705. 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). When 
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, “the court must 
first give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). The plain language of section 705 authorizes 
postponement of the “effective date,” not the “compliance date.” 
Although the EPA would like this court to read “compliance date” 
into the statute, the court should resist “reading words into a 
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statute that do not appear on its face.” Bates v. United States, 522 
U.S. 23, 29 (1997). 
Case law indicates that compliance dates and effective dates 
have different meanings. In a recent case where this question was 
presented the court held that “Effective [dates] and compliance 
dates have distinct meanings.” Becerra v. United States DOI, 17-
CV-02376-EDL, ___F.3d___, 2017 WL 3891678, *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
30, 2017). The Third Circuit has ruled that “mandatory compliance 
date should not be misconstrued as the effective date. . . .” 
Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Inv’r Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d 
Cir. 1995). The D.C. Circuit Court has also ruled on this issue 
finding that section 705 only “permits an agency to postpone the 
effective date of a not yet effective rule. . . not. . . suspend without 
notice and comment a promulgated rule.” Safety–Kleen Corp. v. 
EPA, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS, *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). In 
Becerra, a federal agency sought to postpone compliance dates 
after the effective date of the rule had passed because the rule was 
the subject of ongoing litigation. However, the court found the 
agency’s argument that the court should read compliance dates 
into section 705 language unpersuasive since it would effectively 
“allow the agency broad latitude to delay implementation long 
after a rule was formally noticed to the public as taking effect.” 
Becerra, 17-CV-02376-EDL, ___F.3d___, 2017 WL 3891678, at *9. 
The fear described in Becerra, is a reality in the current case. The 
EPA’s postponement in this case is well beyond the agency’s 
actions in Becerra. The EPA is seeking to postpone compliance 
dates in a rule that has been published since November 3, 2015, 
and effective since January 4, 2016. 80 Fed. Reg. 67,837. 
Even if the EPA was entitled to deference, the agency’s own 
use of “effective date” in the rulemaking process suggests that 
there is a difference between “effective date” and “compliance 
date.” In the 2015 ELG, the EPA specifically prescribes the 
“effective date” separately from enforcement dates in the final rule. 
80 Fed. Reg. 67837, 67838 (Nov. 3, 2015). There would be no point 
for EPA to have a stated “effective date” if each compliance date 
within the 2015 ELG was independently considered an “effective 
date.” This shows that even EPA had interpreted the “effective 
date” unique from “compliance date” in the 2015 ELGs. 
The plain language of section 705, case law in other 
jurisdictions, and the EPA’s own interpretation of “effective date” 
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does not allow this Court to read “compliance date” into the 
definition of “effective date.” 
 
B.  The EPA’s Notice Postponing the 2015 ELG Violates 
 Formal Rulemaking Procedures and Arbitrarily 
 Changes the EPA’s Interpretation of Section 705 of 
 the APA. 
 
The EPA’s suspension of the 2015 ELG after promulgation was 
effectively a repeal of a rule, which is subject to notice and 
comment. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2012). The APA “ensures that an agency 
will not undo all that it accomplished through its rulemaking 
without giving all parties an opportunity to comment on the 
wisdom of repeal.” Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 446, (D.C. Cir. 1982). In 
Becerra, where a federal agency tried to postpone the compliance 
dates of a rule, the court found that “after nearly five years” of 
preparation leading up to the rule’s effective date, the suspension 
of the rule nearly two months after its effective date “did not 
merely ‘maintain the status quo,’ but instead prematurely restored 
a prior regulatory regime.” Becerra, 17-CV-02376-EDL, 
___F.3d___, 2017 WL 3891678, at *1, *9. Much like Becerra, the 
EPA’s suspension of the compliance dates in the 2015 ELG is a 
repeal in all but name. The time between the effective date and the 
compliance dates in the 2015 rule was established to allow the 
permitted community time to “raise capital, plan and design 
systems, procure equipment, and construct and then test systems.” 
80 Fed. Reg. at 67854. Since the effective date of the regulation has 
passed, the industry has already been subject to the pressure of 
preparing for compliance. So, a suspension of the 2015 ELG would 
jolt the industry into the previous regulatory regime rather than 
maintain the status quo. Even the EPA’s stated intentions in the 
notice of postponement indicate that the EPA intended to repeal 
the 2015 ELG. 82 Fed. Reg. 19005 (Apr. 25, 2017) (stating “after 
considering the objections raised in the reconsideration petitions, 
the Administrator determined that it is appropriate and in the 
public interest to reconsider the Rule.”). Postponement in this case 
is effectively a repeal. The EPA is asking this Court for the 
authority to repeal rules outside of the normal notice and comment 
requirements. It would undo all the agency has accomplished 
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through rulemaking without providing the public with proper 
notice or its statutory right to comment. 
Other jurisdictions have recognized postponement of 
promulgated rules as a repeal. The APA does not allow the EPA to; 
“guide a future rule through the rulemaking process, promulgate 
a final rule, and then effectively repeal it, simply by indefinitely 
postponing its operative date. The APA specifically provides that 
the repeal of a rule is “rulemaking subject to rulemaking 
procedures.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 683 F.2d 
752, 762 (3d. Cir. 1982). In NRDC, Inc., the EPA promulgated 
rules, and then postponed them indefinitely after a change in the 
presidential administration. The Court found that this 
postponement failed to meet the requirements of the APA because 
it effectively repealed the rule without notice and comment. Id. at 
755-56. In Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, the court found that section 
705 “does not permit the agency to suspend without notice and 
comment a promulgated rule.” Safety-Kleen Corp., 1996 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 2324. In this case, the 2015 ELG has been promulgated and 
the effective date has passed. Section 705 does not permit the EPA 
to postpone an already promulgated rule as the agency does in the 
current case. 
Furthermore, the EPA’s postponement of the 2015 ELG is 
contrary to the policy of the APA to provide regulatory 
predictability and consistency. The purpose of formal rulemaking 
under the APA is to provide “notice and predictability.” 
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 
(2012). As explained in previous subsections, the EPA’s current 
interpretation of section 705 is at odds with its own historic use of 
“effective dates.” In addition, as explained previously, suspension 
of the 2015 ELG would restore the previous regulatory regime 
rather than maintain the status quo. Allowing the EPA to 
arbitrarily change its interpretation and effectively repeal the ELG 
without notice and comment would negate any predictability the 
APA is supposed to provide. Therefore, the EPA’s notice 
suspending the 2015 ELGs is arbitrary and capricious, contrary to 
law, and fails to observe procedure required by law, and the Court 
must declare the notice null and void. 
 
III. REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 
EPA’S ELG POSTPONEMENT, UNDER THE 
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CWA, THE EPAHAS THE AUTHORITY TO 
INDEPENDENTLY RELYON BPJ TO REQUIRE 
ZERO DISCHARGE OF COALASH AND FLY 
ASH, WHEN A CURRENT ELG DOESNOT APPLY 
TO ALL POLLUTANTS OF CONCERN. 
 
Regardless of this Court’s ruling on the postponement of 
compliance dates of the ELG, the EAB correctly ruled that under 
40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3), the EPA has the authority to set 
effluent limitations on a case-by-case basis for pollutants not 
covered by the ELGs for an industry category. EPA regulations 
specifically allow for a permit writer to regulate pollutants on a 
case-by-case basis, if those pollutants were not controlled by an 
ELG. 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(1)-(2). If the EPA’s 2015 ELG 
postponement is deemed valid, then the EPA must rely on the 1982 
ELG or BPJ on a case-by-case basis where the 1982 ELG does not 
apply to certain pollutants. Because the 1982 ELG does not 
regulate toxic pollutants such as mercury, arsenic, and selenium, 
which are pollutants being discharged by the MEGS facility, the 
EPA may rely on BPJ to require the control of these pollutants by 
requiring zero discharge for bottom ash and fly ash. Therefore, this 
Court should uphold the EAB’s finding that the EPA permit 
writer’s reliance on BPJ was justified. 
The EPA’s regulations are designed specifically to address 
permitting sources, like the MEGS facility, where the applicable 
ELG does not control certain pollutants in the MEGS effluent. 
While the 1982 ELG obligates the EPA to include the control of 
certain pollutants in a NPDES permit, it eschews the control of 
other toxic pollutants such as mercury, arsenic, and selenium. 
Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category; Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and New Source 
Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290 (Nov. 19, 1982). 
Without 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3), the EPA would have to 
abstain from requiring the control of these toxic pollutants not 
addressed by the 1982 ELG. 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(2). 
However, relying on the authority granted to the EPA by the CWA, 
40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) specifically allows the application of 
case-by-case BPJ to pollutants not covered in the ELG: “where 
promulgated [ELGs] only apply to. . . certain pollutants. . . other 
aspects. . .are subject to regulation on a case-by-case basis.” 33 
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U.S.C. § 1251 (2012) et seq.; 40 C.F.R. S 125.3(c)(3) (emphasis 
added). In addition to the EPA’s BPJ authority in 40 C.F.R. 125.3, 
authority also lies in the EPA’s 1982 ELG. The 1982 ELG explicitly 
states, “even if this regulation does not control a particular 
pollutant, the permit issuer may still limit such pollutant on a case-
by-case basis when limitations are necessary to carry out the 
purposes of the [CWA].” 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,302 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, since the 1982 ELG did not control pollutants of concern 
to the MEGS NPDES permit writer, such as mercury, arsenic, and 
selenium, the EPA appropriately relied on BPJ to establish the 
zero discharge requirement. 
Removing the EPA’s ability to rely on BPJ to establish zero 
discharge requirements would render 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) 
meaningless. EPA is required by the CWA to identify and consider 
all pollutants from a source when promulgating source category 
ELGs. 33 U.S.C. 1314(b) (2012). If this court interpreted “apply to” 
in 40 C.F.R. S 125.3(c)(3), to include any pollutant considered in an 
ELG, ELGs would automatically “apply to,” but not control, all 
pollutants for a source category. This would render the situation 
contemplated by 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) that allows 
regulation on a case-by-case basis, “where promulgated [ELGs] 
only apply to. . . certain pollutants,” meaningless because the ELG 
would “apply to” all pollutants. 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) 
implies that the EPA has discretion when promulgating ELGs to 
create industry standards for some pollutants, and maintain the 
authority to address other pollutants on a case-by-case basis. 40 
C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) serves no purpose if the EPA is not 
allowed to rely on BPJ where the 1982 ELG did not set controls for 
specific pollutants. 
“Apply to” must mean control to fulfill the purpose of the CWA. 
An interpretation otherwise would create regulatory gaps where 
pollutants could not be regulated if they were considered by the 
ELG but not controlled. The purpose of ELGs is to carry-out the 
CWA’s objective of “restor[ing] and maint[aining] [the] chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of [the] Nation’s waters,” by 
limiting “the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. . . .” 47 
Fed. Reg. 52,290. Not allowing the EPA permit writer to control 
pollutants of concern that the current ELG does not control, would 
undermine the objectives of the CWA. ELGs are not national 
standards for precluding control of toxic pollutants. 47 Fed. Reg. at 
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52,302 (stating that pollutants not controlled under the ELG may 
be controlled on a case-by-case basis by the regulating body). 
While the EPA’s regulatory language explicitly allows for BPJ 
when pollutants are not covered by an ELG, an EPA manual 
erroneously misinterprets the regulation. The EPA’s NPDES 
Permit Writer’s Manual (Permit Manual) states that “[t]he permit 
writer should make sure that the pollutant of concern is not 
already controlled by the effluent guidelines. . . ,” which is 
consistent with EPA regulations. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Permit Writers’ Manual, § 5.2.3.2, at 5-45-5-46 (Sept. 
2010) However, the Permit Manual then adds “and was not 
considered by EPA when the Agency developed the effluent 
guidelines.” Id. (emphasis added). The Permit Manual adds the 
phrase “and was not considered” into the regulation, despite the 
direct conflict with the express intention of the 1982 ELG and 40 
C.F.R. section 125.3. 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,302; 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3). 
Where courts that have construed 40 C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) 
to prohibit the EPA from exercising BPJ where the 1982 ELG does 
not control specific pollutants, they have relied on the EPA’s 
erroneous interpretation in the Permit Manual, not on established 
regulations. The Supreme Court of Kentucky and an Illinois 
district court both relied on the EPA’s Permit Manual to decide 
when the permitting agency had the authority to issue case-by-case 
effluent limitation. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ky. Waterways 
Alliance, 517 S.W.3d 479, 489; NRDC v. Pollution Control Bd., 37 
N.E.3d 407, 414. Both state courts concluded that because the EPA 
considered the toxic pollutant at issue and “addressed it (even if 
the agency had not set limits),” the permit writer was “required ‘to 
refrain from imposing [BPJ] limitations and [must] instead use the 
applicable [1982] ELG.’” Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ky. 
Waterways Alliance, 517 S.W.3d 479, 489 (quoting NRDC v. 
Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d 407, 414). 
Based on regulatory language, the purpose of ELGs, and the 
objectives of the CWA, an EPA permit writer may rely on BPJ in 
issuing a NPDES permit that covers pollutants that are not 
controlled in an ELG. Therefore, this Court should uphold the 
EAB’s decision. 
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IV. NPDES PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS APPLY 
TO AN ASH POND LOCATED IN A WOTUS WHEN 
THE     EPA VIOLATED THE APA IN EXEMPTING 
SUCH PONDS, AND WHEN THE POND IS A 
POINT SOURCE POLLUTANT. 
 
In determining that the MEGS ash pond is not a WOTUS, the 
EAB incorrectly relied on an EPA action that violated the APA and 
also failed to understand that the ash pond is a point source 
pollutant to the Progress River. Under the APA, an agency action 
that has legal consequences requires public notice and opportunity 
for comment on the action before it is final, except in cases where 
the action is an agency interpretation or good cause exists. Here, 
the EPA failed to comply with the APA because, without notice and 
comment, the EPA effectively rewrote a portion of a rule, which 
does not constitute as an interpretation or meet the good cause 
exception. Therefore, according to APA requirements, this Court 
must invalidate the EPA’s suspension, and any continuations of 
the suspension, and hold that the MEGS ash pond is a WOTUS 
subject to NPDES permitting requirements. 
 However, if this Court does not find the EPA violated the APA, 
this Court should independently find that the ash pond is a point 
source pollutant because of its hydrologic connection to the 
Progress River. Because Fossil Creek is a perennial stream 
contributing flow indirectly to the Progress River via groundwater, 
any leaks into the groundwater are unpermitted discharges with 
the groundwater acting as a conduit. Therefore, regardless of the 
EPA’s APA violation, the Court must rule that the MEGS ash pond 
is subject to NPDES permitting requirements. 
 
A. The EPA failed to comply with the APA Section 553 
when it suspended a portion of the established 
WOTUS definition in its 1980 action. 
 
The language of section 553 of the APA and the CWA, 
Congress’ intent, and case law dictate that the EPA failed to 
comply with the APA in the 1980 Suspension. 45 Red. Reg. at 
48620-01. When the EPA revised the definition section of 40 C.F.R 
§ 122.2 to exclude ash ponds, without providing notice or comment, 
it violated the APA and the CWA. The CWA explicitly states that 
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public participation is required in the “revision. . . of any 
regulation” and “shall be provided for. . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) 
(2012) (emphasis added). Yet, public participation did not occur 
when the EPA revised 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. 
Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 a manmade impoundment which 
“resulted from the impoundment of the waters of the United 
States” is considered a WOTUS, thus the MEGS ash pond would 
have been considered a WOTUS subject to NPDES permitting 
requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2017). However, the two months 
later, the EPA published an action effective immediately that 
suspended the enforcement of this definition. 45 Fed. Reg. 48620-
01 (July 21, 1980). Much like a mother bird who abandons her 
chicks after human touch, the EPA has abandoned the protection 
of the nation’s waters that have been “touched” by human-caused 
waste. However, as is the case with the chick which is still a bird 
after its mother leaves, here the WOTUS is still a WOTUS even 
after being subject to pollution. This indefinite suspension of the 
rule did not provide notice and comment required by the APA and 
the CWA. However, legal consequences flowed from this action 
because polluters who chose to dispose of pollutants in an 
impounded WOTUS no longer had to obtain a NPDES permit. 
Furthermore, the 1980 Suspension relied on improper 
authority to suspend the WOTUS rule. The suspension relies on 33 
U.S.C. § 1251 as its authority. Id. However, nothing in this section 
allows the EPA to change the rule without notice and comment. 33 
U.S.C. § 1251(e). In fact, the CWA explicitly disallows the actions 
that the EPA sanctions with this suspension. Allowing 
unpermitted pollution discharges into a WOTUS simply because 
an impoundment was built in a WOTUS is contrary to law because 
the CWA policy is to protect the nation’s waters and govern 
discharges into any WOTUS. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1342 (2012). 
Therefore, the EPA violated the APA and the CWA in its 1980 
Suspension by reversing the effect of a regulation without 
providing for public participation. 
The EPA’s 1980 Suspension fails to meet the APA’s 
interpretation exception because the 1980 Suspension was 
substantive not interpretive. A modification of a rule must fulfill 
notice and comment requirements because it has a substantial 
impact on the rights and obligations of the public. Nat’l. Retired 
Teachers Ass’n v. U. S. Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 1360, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 
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1979). The 1980 Suspension was effectively a modification because 
it changed the requirements of the rule and had a substantial 
impact on the rights and obligations of specific industries. An 
agency is not allowed to use interpretation to “constructively 
rewrite the regulation.” Nat’l Family Planning and Reproductive 
Health Association. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
In Sullivan, an agency directive conflicted with the explicit 
language of a rule, resulting in a rewriting the rule, which the 
court was an action requiring APA compliance. Id.; See also 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. E.P.A., 643 F.3d 311, 320 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (where the EPA issued a guidance document that 
effectively “changed the law,” thus requiring notice and comment). 
Here, the EPA’s 1980 Suspension directly invalidates portions 
of the rule. Like the agency’s directives in Nat’l Family Planning 
and Reproductive Health Association, Inc. v. Sullivan, EPA’s 1980 
Suspension directly conflicts with the regulations on their face. 
The suspension changed the regulatory definition of a WOTUS. 
The EPA constructively rewrote 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 when it issued 
the 1980 Suspension. The result of the action was that instead of 
having to obtain a NPDES permits for its pollution discharges into 
a WOTUS, Fossil Creek, EnerProg could continue polluting Fossil 
Creek freely. Therefore, this Court should find that the EPA’s 1980 
suspension is a violation of the APA because it constructively 
changed the regulation without providing the required notice and 
comment. 
In addition to failing to meet the interpretation exception, the 
EPA’s 1980 Suspension also fails to meet the APA’s good cause 
exception. To meet the APA’s good cause exception, the EPA must 
determine that compliance is “either impracticable, unnecessary or 
contrary to public interests.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). In writing 
this section, Congress warned that this is not to be construed as an 
“escape clause” and that the agency does not have “discretion to 
disregard its terms.” S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 
(1946). In accordance with Congress’ intent, the D.C. Circuit Court 
held that APA exceptions will be “narrowly construed and only 
reluctantly countenanced.” State of N. J., Dept. of Envtl. Protec. v. 
U.S. Envtl. Protec. Agency, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit, where the EPA made Clean Air Act 
nonattainment designations without notice and comment, the 
court found this did not meet the good cause exception because it 
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should only be used where “delay would do real harm [and not] to 
circumvent the notice and comment requirements whenever an 
agency finds it inconvenient. . . .” U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 
595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979). 
The EPA’s 1980 Suspension does not mention any of the 
requirements for good cause under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). Nor does 
the suspension give any other reason why notice and comment 
requirements should not be observed. 45 Fed. Reg. 48620-01. In 
taking such an action without notice and comment, the EPA is in 
direct contrast with good cause requirements because suspending 
language that would have required polluters to obtain a NPDES 
permit is contrary to the public interest. Furthermore, undue harm 
was not present because the WOTUS polluters were already aware 
of their obligations under the EPA rule that was promulgated two 
months before the 1980 Suspension. 45 FR 48620-01. Given the 
narrow construction of section 553 of the APA, the EPA cannot 
have fulfilled the good cause exception of the section 553 of the APA 
and in issuing its 1980 Suspension, the agency violated the APA. 
 
B. The Court Should Alternatively Find That the 
Connection Between Fossil Creek and Progress 
River Makes Discharge into the MEGS Ash Pond a 
Point Source to the Progress River Requiring a 
NPDES Permit. 
 
EnerProg’s substandard coal ash pond is likely still 
hydrologically connected to the Progress River. Dumping pollution 
into the unlined pond is equivalent to a point source directly 
discharging into the Progress river. A point source is defined as 
“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance. . . from which 
pollutants. . . may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). If 
the substandard ash pond is connected hydrologically to the 
Progress River, the connection would serve as a “conduit” by which 
pollutants are discharged into the Progress River. Therefore, the 
ash pond should be considered a point source to the Progress River, 
and pollutants discharged into the pond must be subject to NPDES 
permitting requirements. 
 Coal ash ponds leaking pollutants into groundwater are 
confined and discrete conveyances discharging pollutants into 
navigable waters subject to NPDES permitting requirements. In a 
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North Carolina district court, where allegedly unlined and leaking 
coal ash lagoons located at a coal-fired power plant were conveying 
pollutants into a nearby river via groundwater, the court held that 
“such coal ash lagoons appear to be confined and discrete. . . [and] 
[a]s confined and discrete conveyances, the lagoons fall within the 
CWA’s definition of a ‘point source.’” Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 428, 443-44 
(M.D.N.C. 2015), motion to certify appeal denied, 1:14-CV-753, 
2016 WL 6783918 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 29, 2016). In doing so, the court 
was in concurrence with six other district courts who have ruled 
similarly that the CWA has jurisdiction “over the discharge of 
pollutants to navigable surface waters via hydrologically connected 
groundwater, which serves as a conduit between the point source 
and the navigable waters.” Id.; see Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of 
Maui, 24 F.Supp.3d 980, 995 (D.Haw.2014); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. 
Grabhorn, Inc., No. CV–08–548–ST, 2009 WL 3672895, at *11 
(D.Or. Oct. 30, 2009); Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (P.R.), 
599 F.Supp.2d 175, 181 (D.P.R.2009); Idaho Rural Council v. 
Bosma, 143 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1180 (D.Idaho 2001); Williams Pipe 
Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F.Supp. 1300, 1319 (S.D.Iowa 1997); 
Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F.Supp. 983, 990 
(E.D.Wash.1994). 
Furthermore, CWA policy supports the court finding that 
NPDES permitting is required for discharges to groundwater 
hydrologically connected to navigable waters. As one court stated: 
“[I]t would hardly make sense for the CWA to encompass a polluter 
who discharges pollutants via a pipe. . . to the riverbank, but not a 
polluter who dumps the same pollutants into a man-made settling 
basin some distance short of the river and then allows the 
pollutants to seep into the river via the groundwater.” N. Cal. River 
Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. C–04–4620 SC, 2005 WL 2122052, 
at *2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 1, 2005). Additionally, EPA regulations 
dictate that NPDES permits are required for groundwater 
discharges “where there is a direct hydrological connection 
between groundwaters and surface waters.” 56 Fed.Reg. 64,876, 
64,892 (Dec. 12, 1991). 
Here, EnerProg has created the coal ash pond in the 
streambed of a perennial tributary to the Progress River. A 
substandard ash pond presents a heightened risk for toxic leaks 
into nearby ground and surface water. The groundwater naturally 
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connects the MEGS ash pond to the Progress River, and not 
holding EnerProg accountable for this discharge would allow the 
polluter to violate the CWA without having to get a permit. This 
Court should stand with the policy of the CWA of protecting the 
biological integrity of our surface waters, and find that pollution 
discharges into the MEGS ash pond are subject to NPDES permit 
requirements. 
 
V. UNDER THE CWA, SECTION 404 REQUIRES A 
PERMIT FOR THE DISCHARGE OF FILL 
MATERIAL INTO A PERENNIAL CREEK THAT 
HAS BEEN USED AS A COAL ASH POND, WHEN 
THE DISCHARGE OF FILL MATERIAL WILL 
OCCUR AFTER THE CLOSURE OF THE POND. 
 
Regardless of this Court’s ruling on the WOTUS status of the 
ash pond, the EAB incorrectly held that a section 404 permit is not 
required for the closure and capping plan. The CWA’s objective is 
to protect and restore the Nation’s waters and in line with that 
objective, restoring CWA protections to a WOTUS that was 
subjected to pollution from a coal power plant is proper. Allowing 
coal ash pollution to remain in a perennial tributary to a navigable 
in-fact water, after that stream is no longer used as a dumping 
ground, is contrary to the CWA. Furthermore, the experience of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with similarly situated 
coal ash pond closures indicates a section 404 permit is required. 
Thus, this Court must rule that the MEGS ash pond closure plan 
necessitates a section 404 permit and the EPA was arbitrary and 
capricious in failing to require a section 404 permit. 
 
A. Once the MEGS Ash Pond Ceases to be Used as a 
Waste Treatment System, EPA’s 1980 Suspension 
No Longer Applies, therefore the Pond Is a WOTUS 
subject to section 404 requirements. 
 
The EPA’s 1980 Suspension excludes waste treatment systems 
created in a WOTUS from the definition of a WOTUS. The MEGS 
ash ponds would under this definition be exempt from the 
definition of a WOTUS. However, once the MEGS ash pond ceases 
to be used as a waste treatment system, the exemption to WOTUS 
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status no longer applies. Thus, under the CACA requirement that 
the ash pond be closed, and in order to fulfill the primary objective 
of the CWA to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the ash pond should no 
longer be exempt from WOTUS status. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (2012) 
(emphasis added). Because the CWA has a specific objective of 
protecting and restoring the Nation’s waters, the presumption of 
the statute is in favor of regulating pollution, not allowing 
pollution to continue without a permit. 
The EAB’s conclusion that the coal ash pond in Fossil Creek is 
not subject to 404 requirements is contrary to the CWA objectives 
and goals and the EPA’s regulations. Nothing in the EPA’s 1980 
Suspension dictates that Fossil Creek would not be a WOTUS after 
retirement of the waste treatment system is closed. In fact, the 
EPA’s Clean Water Rule specifically confirms that “Tributary 
streams, including perennial. . . streams, are chemically, 
physically, and biologically connected to downstream waters, and 
influence the integrity of downstream waters.” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054-
01, 37056 (June 29, 2015). The rule defines WOTUS tributaries as 
those that “contribute flow directly or indirectly to a traditional 
navigable water. . . [and whose] waters that science tells us provide 
chemical, physical, or biological functions to downstream waters 
and that meet the significant nexus standard.” 80 Fed. Reg. at 
37058 (emphasis added). 
 The EPA’s Clean Water Rule and caselaw dictate that Fossil 
Creek is included in the definition of a WOTUS because it has a 
significant nexus to downstream waters. Here, the spring that 
feeds Fossil Creek above the dam has not been blocked or diverted, 
which means that Fossil Creek continues to flow above the MEGS 
ash pond dam, and will continue to flow after the closure of the 
pond. While it may appear that Fossil Creek’s flow has 
disappeared, hydrologic science tells us otherwise. See Tennessee 
Clean Water Network v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 3:15-CV-00424, 
2017 WL 3476069, at *2-*3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2017) (discussing 
the general principles of hydrology and finding that if “the water 
passes through an area filled with pollutants—for example, a large 
impoundment of coal ash waste—it may pick up some of those 
pollutants and then convey them to nearby surface waters”). Fossil 
Creek’s flow will continue after the closure of the dam, and will 
directly contribute pollutants to the Progress River after it passes 
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through the filled in pond. Therefore, once the ash pond is closed, 
the impoundment in the bed of Fossil Creek still has a significant 
nexus to the Progress River and, alternatively, the EPA’s 
Suspension will be inapplicable because the pond will no longer be 
a waste treatment system. Therefore, the MEGS ash pond must be 
considered a WOTUS subject to section 404 permitting 
requirements after the pond is no longer used as a waste treatment 
system. 
 
B. Regardless, USACE’s Actions in Similar Cases 
Indicates that a Plan to Discharge Fill Material 
into the Fossil Creek Streambed is Subject to 
Section 404 Permit Requirements. 
 
The closure of the MEGS coal ash pond would be considered a 
dredge and fill action under EPA regulations. The CWA requires 
that any proposal to discharge fill material into a WOTUS be 
permitted under section 404. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(2012); 33 U.S.C. 
§1344 (2012). Section 404 of the CWA requires that operations 
such as dredge and fill of a WOTUS be subject to USACE 
permitting. Id. Fill is defined as “material placed in [a WOTUS]” 
that effectively replaces the WOTUS with “dry land” or changes 
the “bottom elevation of any portion of the [WOTUS].” 33 C.F.R. 
§ 323.2 (2017). In this case, EnerProg’s closure plan includes the 
dewatering and capping of a coal ash pond that was created in a 
perennial tributary to a WOTUS. R. at 6. Because the tributary 
must be considered a WOTUS as well, the dewatering of the MEGS 
ash pond would be an action that replaces the WOTUS with “dry 
land” which is directly covered under the 33 C.F.R. § 323.2. 
Therefore, under EPA regulations, the dewatering of the MEGS 
ash pond would be an action that is subject to section 404 of the 
CWA. 
Past decisions by the USACE with similar plans to close coal 
ash ponds located in a former perennial streambed indicate that a 
section 404 permit is required. In Kentucky, the USACE required 
a 404 permit for Kentucky Power’s proposal that closed a coal ash 
disposal pond located in an area that impacted perennial stream 
channels. Public Notice of Section 404 Permit, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, ID No. LRL – 2014- 417-mdh (May 23, 2016). Kentucky 
Power proposed to close the pond by capping the ash in place, 
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which would have resulted in covering portions of two nearby 
perennial streams. Id. Due to the unavoidable impact that closure 
and filling had on nearby streams, the USACE determined that the 
water in question was a WOTUS that required a section 404 
permit. Proposed AEP Proposed AEP Big Sandy Fly Ash Pond 
Closure - Agency Interest #2610 (April 2015). Here, EnerProg’s 
closure of the MEGS ash pond has an even greater impact on a 
WOTUS, than the ash pond in Kentucky, because the MEGS pond 
is located in a perennial stream, Fossil Creek. Similar to Kentucky 
Power’s proposal, EnerProg proposes to leave its coal ash in place, 
dewater it, and cap it. The USACE’s determination in Kentucky 
indicates that EnerProg’s proposal necessitates an application for 
a section 404 permit. EnerProg’s proposal will result in a changed 
elevation of the bottom of Fossil Creek’s streambed, and ultimately 
will replace a portion of the stream with dry land. The USACE 
failure to apply 404 permitting requirements on EnerProg’s ash 
pond closure plan is not in accordance with past decisions, which 
is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, because the EPA’s 1980 
Suspension exclusion does not apply and EnerProg’s proposed 
action effectively replaces Fossil Creek with dry land, a section 404 
permit is required. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
EnerProg requests to avoid compliance with Progress state 
law requirements and EPA regulations should not be granted by 
this Court. This Court should affirm the EAB’s rulings on issues 
one, two, and three. Progress has the authority to certify a NPDES 
permit, without federal review, on the condition that EnerProg 
comply with its water protection laws. Additionally, EnerProg 
cannot avoid compliance with the 2015 ELGs mandating zero 
discharge of coal ash because the EPA’s notice violates the APA, 
therefore the Court should vacate EPA’s action. Further, 
regardless of the EPA’s APA violation, the EPA has the authority 
to rely on BPJ because the 1983 ELG fails to control pollutants of 
concern. However, the Court should find that the EPA acted 
arbitrary and capricious in issues four and five. The Court should 
declare the EPA’s 1980 Suspension null and void because the 
EPA’s action exempting the MEGS pond from CWA requirements 
violates APA procedure, and, further, the ash pond is likely a point 
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source pollutant to the Progress River. Lastly, due to relevant 
USACE experience with similar ash ponds, the Court should shape 
an equitable remedy that leaves the requirement that EnerProg 
close and dewater its ash pond in place, however, remand the 
specific issue of whether a section 404 permit applies to EnerProg’s 
capping plan to the EPA and USACE. 
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